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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD LEWIS

)

Plaintiff and Respondent

)

vs.

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

'LYNN S. PORTER dba LYNN PORTER
HOUSEMOVERS

)
)

Case No. 144 86

Defendant and Appellant

)

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Lloyd Lewis alleging a contract
between the parties for the performance of services in moving
houses and for an accounting between the parties in the performance of the contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried by the Court without a jury on the 3rd
and 4th day of December, 1973.

Thereafter, the Court on the 11th

day of December, 19 75, made and entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.

At the same time, receiving

the Defendant's Motion to Reopen the case or in the alternative,
Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.
The District Court of Cache County on the 20th day of January, entered its memorandum decision followed by an order of the
District Court on Jan 27th denying the Defendant's motion•

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the Trial Court's Order, reopening the trial and for an order to reopen or in the alternative, for a new trial*
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant and the Plaintiff of June of 1973, entered
into an agreement whereby Defendant would aid the Plaintiff in
the moving of pre-built homes from the factory to the construction site of the home.
Plaintiff moved a substantial

Pursuant to the agreement, the
number of homes for the defendant

and as a result thereof, there is between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant, sums due and owing, and offsets and discounts against
said sums.
The parties were unable to resolve their difference aniciably.
Therefore, on the 20th day of March, 1974, the Plaintiff
filed a Complaint in the above and entitled matter alleging that
there was due and owing the sum of $11,922.30•
The Defendant through the Lav; Firm of Hillyard & Gunnell
in Logan, Utah filed an answer on April 16, 1974. One year
later on April 17, 1975, depositions were taken of the parties
and on October 20, 1975, Mr. Gordon Low of the firm of Hillyard
& Gunnell withdrew as the attorney for the Defendant.

Following

the withdrawal of counsel of October 20, 1975, on October.22,
1975, a Notice of Trial was forwarded to the Court and the following day, aDigitized
Notice
of Change of Attorney was filed.
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the parties, a Notice of Setting, wherein this matter was set
as a second setting for December 3, 19 75.
Following the Notice of Setting, various attempts were
made to resolve the case without success and on December 3,
1975, the Court convened for the trial of the matter.

The

.'.-.

Plaintiff was present being represented by his attorney, David
W. Sorenson and Defendant's attorney was present, however, the
Defendant and the Defendant's witnesses were conspicuously absent.

Defendant's attorney, as the record shows ( See Pages

1 through

4

) was unable to•explain the absence of Defendant

and Defendant's witnesses and moved the Court for a continuance
The Trial Court denied the motion and the trial started in the
absence of the Defendant and the Defendant's witnesses.
Following a partial trial, the Court reconvened on December 4 r
1975, v/ith the Defendant still absent from court; however, with some
of the Defendant's witnesses present in Court. The entire matter
was tried

before the court without the presence of the Defendant and

the Court rendered judgment for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant
in the sum of $9,078.27, together with Cost of Court. On December
11th,... 1975, the court received from the Defendant, a Motion to
Reopen Defendant's portion of the case for the purpose of introducing
additional testimony, to which there was attached the Affidavit
of LynnS. Porter, the defendant, in the above entitled matter
or in the alternative a Motion for a New Trial.

The same date

as the motionDigitized
was byfiled,
Court
the
of fact,
the Howard W.the
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On December 22, 197 5, twelve days after the

filing of the motion, Plaintiff objected to the motion on
January 6, 1976, the Defendant filed a brief containing memorandum and authorities.
On January 20, 1976, the District Court entered its memorandum decision followed by an order of the Court denying the
Defendant's motion for a new trial. On January 27, 1976. the
Defendant filed notice of appeal of February 20, 1975, requesting
the present review of the Court's refusal to reopen the case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE 1DEFENDANTS MOTION TO REOPEN THE TRIAL FOR THE PURPOSE OF HEARING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.
It will be noted that the Defendant first seeks to reopen
the case for the taking of additional testimony, rather than a
motion for a new trial.

The motion for a new trial is a

alternative remedy requested by the Defendant.
The motion to reopen was made after the conclusion of the
evidence and at the same time or prior to the signing of the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment by the Court.
Viewing -the facts in favor of the Plaintiff at the same time as the
entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lav/, and Judgment. The
motion is not only timely made, but prior to the rights, liabilities of either party being jeopardized.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is recognized by the Defendant that Courts must; in
the orderly conduct of their business/ fix a trial date, conduct
the trial, and have a conclusion to the matter within a reasonable time.

Recognizing this premise, the Defendant as soon

as practicable following the trial, moved to reopen the trial
at a time when neither party v/ould be jeopardized by the taking
of additional testimony, at a time when the facts were fresh in
the parties mind and at a time prior to the entry of judgment
and the rights of the prevailing parties to

proceedings for the

enforcement of judgment were commenced.
Rule 59 of the-Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that l'on
a motion for a new trial in an action tried without . a jury, the
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of lav; and make
nev; findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:1'

The rules themselves create a distinction between a nev; trial

and a motion to reopen.

The grounds being the same, but the impact

upon the court and its procedures being different.
Moore's Federal Practice Volume, 6A, Page 59.04, states
as follows:
11

While 'the motion to reopen has certain similarities to a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, its purpose is different in that the additional testimony may or may not be newly discovered; and the
motion does not seek a retrial but the right to offer the additional testimony and evidence before the present tryer of
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-6facts has rendered the decision so the tryer, jury, or court
may proceed to render a decision on the testimony that has been
taken and the proposed additional testimony. Of course, the
similarity between the two motions becomes more pronounced as
the case nears actual decision. For instance, in a court case
where the judge has not rendered a decision, but has indicated
by an opinion or otherwise how he intends to decise, a motion
to take additional testimony to supply in effect formal proof
need not be treated as a motion for a new trial; that if the
additional testimony goes beyond that, then the motion to take
the additional testimony closely approaches that of a motion
for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence and
the trial court may, if it sees fit, test the priority of the
motion by the standards applicable to the latter motion.11
"Like the motion of a new trial on the grounds of ne>;ly
discovered evidence, a motion to reopen the case to take
additional testimony is normally addressed to the discretion
of the trial court and its discretionary denial or grant
of the motion will be interfered with by an appellant court
order only for abuse
"
At the time of the Defendant's motion to reopen the District Court had committed itself with respect to the decisions
but had signed neither Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law,.
neither party was jeopardized by the petition and the time element
involved in taking additional evidence would have been nominal.
See Haugen vs. U. S., 153 F. 2d 850 and the case of Bowles vs.
Six States Coal Corporation 64 Federal Supplement 651, where the
Plaintiff's motion to reopen was granted although there was not
justification for Plaintiff's oversight in offering proof where
the Defendant's would not be injured and the reopening is in the
interest of substantial justice.
The rules governing the motion to reopen versus a motion for
a new trial appeared to be substantially different.

In a motion for

a new triail, Digitized
the Court
appears
to have
of discretion
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reubenbroader
Clark Law School,grounds
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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or denial and rightly so in that a new trial can be lengthy,
time consuming, and a economic detriment to the parties involved.

Whereas, a motion to reopen, timely made, is neither

lengthy, or does it have the economic disadvantages of a new trial*
The Court upon granting a motion to reopen can limit the testimony and scope; and therefore, effectively control the destiny
of the trial.

It would appear, therefore, that the range of the

Court's discretion is more limited in an motion to reopen than
in a motion for a new trial.

Therefore where a trial court

may abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a motion to reopen
an appellant court might reasonably find no abuse of discretion in
refusals to grant a new trial where the fact are exactly the
same.
It is, therefore, the Defendant's contention that the
trial court abused its discretion in failing to reopen the above
entitled matter to hear evidence illicited from the Defendant" *
concerning matters of defense to the claims of the plaintiff
-which were not available at the time of trial because:
1.

Not all of the documentary evidence had been re-

searched by the parites.

(See transcript, P. 15)

That Plaintiff

did not have all the evidence available to him. (see transcript
P . - 20)

.;;:';•:

2.

That the Defendant's personal presence at the trial •

would materially aid the Court in reaching a decision.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-8POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING FINDINGS OF
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 'AND "THE JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF,
" .
LYNN S. PORTER dba LYNN S. PORTER HOUSEMOVERS, an individual.
The transcript throughtout its entirety until page 53 indicated that there was a transaction between the Plaintiff and
the Defendant, Lynn S. Porter.

However, at page 53 of the trans-

cript, it is noted by Pauline McMillan, a employee of Lynn Porter Housemovers, Inc., a Corporation. Her testimony is supported
by Randall Yeates, TR 93 testinoney that caa Corporation Lz ov/ner
of the equipment involved in the litigation and was the real
entity which did business with the plaintiff and by reason it
appears from the record that plaintiff should have brought in
as a party to the action, Lynn S. Porter Housemovers, Inc.,
and the trial court erred in granting judgment against the
Defendant who is neither a proper party to the action nor the
entity that the testimony shows to be the party liable.
CONCLUSION
The defendant concedes that his absense from the trial
alone does not justify a reversal by this Court.

However, the

Defendant's absense coupled with the fact the the Defendant
made a timely motion to reopen the case for additional testimony should have been given additional consideration by the
trial Court.

The trial court abused its discretion in failing

to reopen the case to include the defendant's testimony as to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

such pertinent matters as the real party in interest, matters
of defense, unknov; till the trial of the case.
In an event, a new trial should be granted based upon the
grounds that the evidence clearly shows the proper party in interest to be a corporation entitled Lynn S. Porter Housemovers,
Inc., and not the Defendant as an individual./
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of May, 19 76.
PRESTON, HARRIS, HARSIS & PRESTO?!

\Uff/l{

Aff-rfsCtedri
CfT 1

George W^Prestofi
Attorney for the DefendantAppellant
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 34321

I hereby certify that I mailed ten (10) copies of the foregoing
appellant's brief to Allen E. Mecham, Clerk of Supreme Court of the
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